nent. If scientists can study waking experience, waking sensation, thought, imagination, consciousness. they can surely study the varieties ofthese phenomena that occur during sleep. in dreaming. This riposte is not, of course, a consideration that would impress Malcolm. for it is simply an announcement of faith in the received view. the view that dreams do consist of sensations, thoughts, and so forth occurring during sleep. and Malcolm already knows that the view he is attacking inspires such faith. In any event, as everyone expected, Malcolm's words have had tilde or DO discouraging effect on dream researchers. Their work continues apace to this day. apparently with a degree of fruition that makes a mockery of Malcolm's view. So let us suppose, contra Makolm, that the researchers are neither the perpetrators nor the victims of a conceptual aime, and see where it leads us. Let us suppose that the dream researcher's concept of dreaming is not only received, but the true and unconfused concept ofdreaming. Whatare the prospects, then, for the scientific elaboration of the received view?
It is well known that periods of rapid eye movements (REMs) occur during sleep, and correlate well with subsequent reports of having dreamed. There are also characteristic EEG patterns usually concurrent with the REM episodes, and other physiological correlates that go to suggest that dreams do indeed occur during sleep, and can now be timed, confirmed to occur, and measured in all manner of ways. One tantalizing finding has been the apparent occasional content-relativity ofthe REMs. A penon whose REMs are predominantly horizontal is awakened and reports adream in which he watched two people throwing tomatoes at each other. A predominandy vertical pattern in REMs iscorrelated with a dream report of picking basketballs off the floor and throwing them up at the basket, II A neurophysiological model" of dreaming would plausibly construe these REMs as relatively gross and peripheral effects of a more determinate content-relative process deeper in the brain, which we might hope some day totranslau, in this sense: we might be able to predict from certain physiological events observed during sleep that the subsequent dream report would allude to, for example, fear. falling from a height, eating something cold, even (in the • David Foulkes. TItI PJ'jdwltJg:J of SlIrp (New York, 1966 ).
• Putnam (op. cit.) points out that a c:rucial lacuna in Malcolm'. verificationist arlUUlCnlS against RENa as cvidc:ncc confirming the received view i. hiI failure to consider the confirmalioJ;l relation. arising from the UIe of developed theorie and modele (p. 226) . At a number of points this paper attempb to fill that gap.
Golden Age of neurocryptography) buying a train ticket to New Haven for $12.65 and then forgetting which pocket it was in. The prospect ofagenrralized capacity to predict dream narratives in such detail would bevanishingly small in the absence ofa highly systematic and well-entrenched theory of representation in the brain, but let us suppose for the nonce that such a theory is not only in principle possible, but the natural culmination of the research strategies that are already achieving modest success in "translating" relatively gross and peripheral nervous-system activity. ' Now some people claim never to dream. and many people waken to report that they have dreamed but cannot recall any details. The latter usually have a strong conviction that the dream did have details, though they cannot recall them, and even when we can recall our dreams, the memories fade very fast, and the mere act of expreeeing them seems to interfere, to speed up the memory loss.
Here the impression of details there then but now lost is very strong indeed. REM researchers now confidendy state that their research shows that everybody has dreams (and every night); some of us just seldom-or never-recall them. It must be unsettling to be assured that one has dreamed. when one is positive one has not; Malcolm could be expected to diagnose one's reaction to such an assurance as the shudder of conceptual violation,' but that would be an overstatement. The data of common experience strongly suggest a gradation in people's capacities to recall (both dreams and other items) and it should be nothing worse than an odd but obvious implication of the received view that one could dream without recalling just as one can promise without recalling or be raucowly drunk without recalling.
Guided by common experience and the received view. then, we can imagine our scientists of the future isolating the memory mechanisms responsible for dream recall. and finding ways ofchemically facilitating or inhibiting them. This is surely plausible; research into the chemistry of memory already suggests which chemicals might have these powers. We would expect that the scientists' claims to a theory ofthe dream-recall mechanism would be buttress- So we imagine future dream theory to posit two largely separable processes: first, there are neural events during sleep (more specifically during REM periods having certain characteristic EEG correlates) that systematically represent (are systematically correlatable with) the "events occurring in the dream," and during this process there is a second, memory-loading process so that these events can be recalled. on waking (when the memory process works). Dreams areJ1nsmtMl. and simultaneously rlCOt"tkd in memory, and we might be able to interfere with or prevent the recording without disturbing the presentation.
This posited process of memory-loading and playback must be saved from simplistic interpretation ifwe are to maintain any vestige of realism for our fantasy. It is rarely if ever the case that a dreamer awakens and proceeds to recite with vacant stare a fixed narrative. Consider a fictional example. John Dean, a recently acclaimed virtuoso of recoUection, is asked about a certain meeting in the Oval Office. Was Haldeman present? Consider some possible replies.
(1) "No." (2) "I can't (or don't) recall his being there." (3) "I distinctly recall that he was not there." (4) "I remember noticing (remarking) at the time that he was not there."
IfDean says (1) offen based on other things he recalls will not be expressing any reasoning he knows he went through before his initial negative reply. He may not even be able to explain why or how his memory dictates this answer to the question, and yet be lure, and deservedly sure, that his reply is a sincere and reliable dictate of memory.
To summarize: sometimes we can sincerely answer a question of recollection with an answer like (4), but often we cannot, and sometimes we draw a blank, but in all these cases there are conclusions we can draw based on what in some sense we directly remember in conjunction with common and proprietary knowledge, and these conclusiom need not be drawn in a process of conscious reasoning.
Whatever it is that is directly remembered can play its evidentiary role in prompting an answer of recollection without coming into consciousness. This suggests that when we remember some event, there is some limited amount of information that is there, not necessarily in consciousness but available in one way or another for utilization in composing our recollections and answering questions we or others raise. Perhaps what occupies this functional position is an immensely detailed recording of our experience to which our later access is normally imperfect and partial (although under hypnosis it may improve). Perhaps there is enough infonnation in this position to reconstitute completely our past experience and present us, under special circumstances. with a vivid hallucination ofreliving the event." However much is in this position in Dean, however, it is not possible that Dan Rather's absence is there except byimplication, for his absence was not experienced by Dean at the time. any more than up to this moment you have been experiencing Rather's absence from this room. What the posited memory-loading process records, then, is whatever occupies this functional position at a later time. The "playback" of dream recollections. like other recollections, is presumably seldom if ever complete or uninterpretcd, and often bits of information are utilized in making memory claims without being played back in consciousness at all,
In dreaming there is also a third process that is distinguished both in the layman's version of the received view and in fancier theories, and that is the composition of what is presented and recorded. In various ways this process exhibits intelligence: dream stories are usually coherent and realistic (even surrealism has a realistic background), and are often gripping, complex, and of course loaded with symbolism, Dream composition utilizes the dreamer's general and particular knowledge, her recent and distant experience, and is guided in familiar ways by her fears and desires, covert and overt.
Studying these three processes will require tampering with them, and we can imagine that the researchers will acquire the technological virtuosity to be able to influence, direct, or alter the composition process, to stop, restart, or even transpose the presentation processas it occurs, to prevent or distort the recording process. We can even imagine that they will be able to obliterate the "veridical" dream memory and substitute for it an undreamed narrative. This eventuality would produce a strange result indeed. Our dreamer would wake up and report her dream, only to be assured by the researcher that she never dreamed that dream, but rather another, which they proceed to relate to her. Malcolm sees that the scientific elaboration ofthe received view countenances such a possibility-in-principle and • cr. Wilder Penfield's deScriptioDi of elcctrode-induced memory hallucinationl, in Tlu EzcittIJk QIrl,z in Con.sdau.s Mtm, (Springfield, Illinoil, 1958). for him this amounts to a reduaw ad abstmlum of the received view.10 but again, this is an overreaction to an admittedly strange circumstance. Given the state of the art of dream research today, were someone to contradict my clear recollection of what I had just dreamed, my utter skepticism would be warranted. but the sciencefictional situation envisaged would be quite different. Not only would the researchers have proved their powers by correctly predicting dream recollections on numerous occasions, but they would have a theory that explained their successes. And we need not suppose the dream they related to the dreamer would be entirely alien to her ears, even though she had no recollection of it (and in fact a competing recollection). Suppose it recounted an adventure with some secretly loved acquaintance of hers. a person unknown to the researchers. The stone wall of skepticism would begin to crumble.
The story told 80 far does not, I take it, exhibit the conceptual chace Malcolm imagines: strange as it is, I do not think it would evoke in the layman, our custodian of ordinary concepts, the nausea of incomprehension. As a premise for a science-fiction novel it would be almost pedestrian in its lack of conceptual horizonbending.
But perhaps this is not at all the way the theory of dreaming will develop. Malcolm notes in passing that it has been suggested by some researchers that dreams may occur during the moments of waking, not during the prior REM periods. Why would anyone conjecture this? Perhaps you have had a dream leading logically and coherently up to a climax in which you are shot, whereupon you wake up and are told that a truck has just backfired outside your open window. Or you are fleeing someone in a building, you climb out a window, walk along the ledge, then fall-and wake up on the floor having faDen out ofbed. In a recent dream of mine I searched long and far for a neighbor's goat: when at last I found her she bleated baa-a--a-and ] awoke to find her bleat merging perfectly with the buzz of an electric alarm clock. I had not used or heard for months. Many people, I find, have anecdotes like this to relate, but the scientific literature disparages them, and] can find only one remotely welt-documented case from an experiment: different stimuli were being used to waken dreamers, and one subject was wakened by dripping cold water on his back. He related a dream in ····Dreaming and Skepticism,n sec. VIII, esp. p. SO. which he was singing in an opera. Suddenly he heard _saw that the soprano had been struck by water falling from above; he ran to her and as he bent over her, felt water dripping on his back. 1l What are we to make of these reporter The elaboration of the received view we havejust sketched can deal with them, but at a high cost: precognition. If the terminal events in these dreams are strongly fmPaTed fM by the narrative. if they do not consist of radically juxtaposed turns in the narrative (for example, the goat turns into a telephone and starts ringing), then the composition process must have been directed by something having "knowledge" of the future. That is too high a price for most of us to pay. no doubt. Perhaps all these anecdotes succumb to a mixture of reasonable skepticism, statistics (coincidences do happen, and are to be "expected" once in a blue moon), the disoovery of subtle influences from the environment. and various other deflating redescriptions. But if all else failed we could devise any number ofvariant dream theories that accommodated these "miracles" in less than miraculous ways.
Perhaps, to echo the earlier conjecture, dreams are composed and presented veryfast in the interval between bang, bump, or buzz and full consdousness, with some short delay system postponing the full "perception" of the noise in the dream until the presentation of the narrative is ready for it. Or perhaps in that short interval dreams are composed, presented, and recorded badr.wards and then remembered front to back. Or perhaps there is a "library" in the brain of undreamed dreams with various indexed endings, and the bang or bump or buzz has the effect of retrieving an appropriate dream and inserting it, cassette-like, in the memory mechanism.
None of these theories can be viewed as a mere variation or rival elaboration of the received view. If one of them is true, then the received view is false. And since these rival theories, including the theory inspired by the received view, are all empirical, subject to confirmation and refutation, and since the rival theories even have some (admittedly anecdotal) evidence in their favor, we are constrained to admit that the received view might simply turn out to be described in our confirmed theory, whichever it is. Malcolm sees that all this is implied by the received viewand takes it to be yet another rtduelio ad absurdum of it: any view that could permit the discovery that "we are always only under the iUusion of having had a dream" is "senseless."11 But again, Malcolm's response tothis implication is too drastic. The claim that we had been fooled for millennia into believiogin dreams would be hard to swallow, but then we would not have to swallow it unless it had the backing of a strongly confirmed scientific theory, and then this claim would put no greater strain on our credulity than we have already endured from the claims of Copernicus, Einstein, and others. It would be rather like learning that dream-recall was like dij6 vu-it only seemed that you had experienced it before-and once you believed that, it would no longer even seem (as strongly) that you were recalling. The experience of "dream recall" would change for us. 13 My attack on the received view is not, however, a straightforward empirical attack. I do not wish to aver that anecdotal evidence about dream anticipation disproves the received view, but I do want to consider in more detail what the issues would be were a rival to the received viewto gain support. I hope to show that the received view is more vulnerable to empirical disconfinnation than its status as the received view would lead us to expect. Of the rival theories, the cassette-library theory runs most strongly against our pretheoretica1 convictions, for on the other two there still is some vestige of the presumed presentation process: it isjust much faster than we had expected, or happens backwards. On the cassette view, our "precognitive" dreams are never dreamed at all, but just spuriously "recalled" on waking. If our memory mechanisms were empty until the moment of waking, and then received a whole precomposed dream narrative in one lump, the idea that precognitive dreams are experienced episodes during sleep would have to go by the board.
Suppose we generalize the cassette theory to cover all dreams: all dream narratives are composed directly into memory banks; which, if any, ofthese isavailable to waking recollection depends on various factors-precedence of composition, topicality of waking stimulus, 
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DdNIEL C. DENNETT degree of "repression", and so forth. On this view, the process of presentation has vanished, and although the dream cassettes would have to be filled at some time by a composition process, that process might welloccur during our waking hours, and spread over months (it takes a long time to write a good story). The composition might even occur aeons before our birth; we might have aninnate library of undreamed dream cassettes ready for appropriate insertion in the playback. mechanism. Stranger things have been claimed. Even on the received view the composition process is an unconscious or subconscious process, of which we normally have no more e:cperienu than of the processes regulating our metabolism; otherwise dreams could not be suspenseful. (I say "nonnally" for there does seem to be the phenomenon ofself-conscious dreaming, where we tinker with a dream, run it by several times, attempt to resume it where it left off. Here the theatrical metaphor that enlivens the received view seems particularly apt. After tinkering like the playwright. we must sit back, get ourselves back into the audience mood, suspend disbelief, and re-enter the play. Some researchers call these occasions lucid dreams. But usually we are not privy to the composition process at all, and so have no inkling about when it might occur.) Research might give us goodgrounds for believing that dream narratives that were composed. onto cassettes in the morning decayed faster than cassettes composed in the afternoon, or during meals.
A more likely finding of the cassette-theorist would be that the composition process occurs during sleep, and more particularly, during periods of rapid eye movements, with characteristic EEG patterns. One might even be able to "translate" the composition process-that is, predict dream recollections from data about the composition process. This theory looks suspiciously like the elaboration of the received theory, except for lacking the presentation process. Cassette narratives, we are told, are composed in narrative order, and long narratives take longer to oompose, and the decay time for cassettes in storage is usually quite short; normally the dream one "recalls" on waking was composed just minutes earlier, a fact attested to by the occasional cases ofcontent-relativity in one ofthe byproducts of cassette composition: rapid eye movements. On this theory dream memories are produced just the way the received theory says they are, except for one crucial thing: the process of dream-memory production is entirely unconscious, involves no awareness or experiencing at all. Even "lucid dreams" can be accommodated easily on this hypothesis, as follows: although the com-position and recording processes are entirely unconscious, on occasion the composition process inserts traces of itself into the recording via the literary conceit of a dream within a dream. Now we have a challenge to the received view worth reckoning with. It apparently accounts for all the data of the REM researchers as well as the received view does, 80 there is no reason for sober investigators not to adopt the cassette theory forthwith if it has any advantages over the received view. And it seems that it does: it has a simple explanation of precognitive dreams (if there are any) and it posits one less process by eliminating a presentation process whose point begins to be lost.
But what greater point could a process have? In its presence we have experience; in its absence we have none. As Thomas Nagel would put it, the central issue between these two theories appears to be whether or not it is like anything to dream.ts On the cassette theory it is not like anything to dream, although it is lib somethingto hawdreamed. On the cassette theory, dreams arc not experiences we have during sleep; where we had thought there were dreams, there is only an unconscious composition process and an equally unconscious memory-loading process.
A few years ago there was a flurry of experimentation in learning-while-you-sleep. Tape recordings of textbooks were played in the sleeper's room, and tests were run to see if there were any subsequent signs of learning. As I recall, the results were negative, but some people thought the results were positive. If you had asked one of them what it WQS like to learn in one's sleep. the reply would presumably have been: "It was not like anything at all-I was sound asleep at the time. I went to sleep not knowing any geography and woke up knowing quite a bit. but don't ask me what it was like. It wasn't like anything." If the cassette theory of dreams is true, dream-recollection production is a similarly unexperienced process.
Ifasked what it is like to dream one ought to say (because it would be the truth): "It is not like anything. I gotosleep and when I wakeup I find I have a tale to tell, a 'recollection' as it were." It is Malcolm's view that this is what we ought to say, but Malcolm is not an explicit champion of the cassette theory or any other empirical theory of dreaming. His reasons, as we shall see, are derived from "conceptual analysis." But whatever the reasons are, the conclusion seems out- give up; we find it virtually unintelligible that we could be wrong about it. And yet the point of difference between it (as elaborated into a theory by scientists) and its rival. the cassette theory, isapparently a technical. theoretical matter about which the layman's biases, his everyday experience, and even his personal recollections of dreams are without authority or even weight. What sbould we do? Sit back and wait for the experts to tell us, hoping agaiIllt hope that dreams will turn out to be, after all, experiences? That seems ridiculous.
If that seems ridiculous, perhaps it is ridiculous. Can some way be found to protect the received view from the possibility of lasing this contest? If we do not for a minute believe it could lose, we must suppose there is some principled explanation of this. One might set out in a verificationist manner,tIS What could possibly settle the issue between the received view and the cassette theory if subjects' recollections were deemed neutral? The conclusion of one view is that dreams are experiences, and of the other that they are not, but if subjects' recollections were not held to becrit8ri4l, nothing else could count as evidence for or against the rival theories, at least with regard to this disputed conclusion. Therefore the claimed difference between the two theories is illusory, or perhaps we should say they are both pseudo-theories. This will not do. We can easily imagine the two theories to share a concept of experience, and even to agree on which data would go to show that dreams were, in this shared technical sense, experiences. Nor would this technical concept of experience have to look all that unordinary. We have many common ways of distinguishing which among the events that impinge on us are experienced and which are not, and wecan imagine these theories to build from these ordinary distinctions a powerful shared set of well-confirmed empirically necessary and sufficient ronditions for events to be experienced. If, for instance, some part of the brain is invariably active in some characteristic way when some event in waking life is, as we ordinarily say, experienced, and if moreover we have a theory that says why this should be so, the absence of such brain activity during REM periods would look bad for the received view and good for the cassette view.
But if that is what we should look fOT, the received view is in trouble, for one routinely recognized condition for having an experience is that one beconscious. or awake. and dreamers are DoL A well-confirmed physiological condition for this is that one's reticular activating system be "on," which it is not during sleep. The fact that one is in a sound sleep goes a long wayto confirming that one is not having experiences, as ortlinari9 understood. Malcolm would make this criterial, but that is one more overstatement. Lack of reticular system activity strongly suggests that nothing is being experienced during REMs, but the defender of the received view can plausibly reply that reticular activation is only a condition of f&Ot"mtd experience, and can point to the frequent occurrence during REM periods of the DOnna! physiological accompaniments of fear, anxiety, delight, and arousal as considerations in favor of an extended concept of experience. How could one exhibit an emotional reaction to something not even experienced? The debate would not stop there, but we need not follow it further now. The fact remains that the physiological data would be clearly relevant evidence in the dispute between the theories, and not all the evidence is on the side of the received view.
Still, one might say, the very relevance of physiological evidence shows the dispute not to involve our ordinary concept ofexperience at all, but only a technical substitute. For suppose we were told without further elaboration that the theory inspired by the received view had won the debate, had proved. to be the better theory. We would not know what, if anything, had been confirmed by this finding. Which of our hunches and biases would be thereby vindicated, and are any of them truly in jeopardy?
This plausiable rhetorical questions suggests that none of our precious preconceptions about dreaming could be in jeopardy, a conclusion that "conceptual analysis" might discover for us. How might this be done? Let us return to the comparison between the cassette view of dreams and the speculation that one might learn in one's sleep. I suggested that subjects in either circumstance should, on waking, deny that it was like anything to have undergone the phenomenon. But there would be a crucial difference in their waking states, presumably. For the dreamer, unlike the sleep-learner, would probably want to add to his disclaimer: "Of course it S8IfIIS to meto have been like something!" The sleep learner has new knowl- 111 When we try to make the principle extend through memory to the past, however, we run into difficulties. There is no good reason to deny that memories can be spurious, and there is plenty of confirmation that they can. This is somewhat obscured by some looseness in our understanding ofthe verb "remember." Sometimes we draw a distinction between remembering and seeming to remember such that remembering, like knowing. is veridical. On this reading it follows that ifyou remember something to have beene, it W3SX. Ifit was not", you only seem to remember that it was. But when I say, about a restaurant we are dining in, "This isn't the way I remember it," my claim is equivocal. I may not be claiming the restaurant has changed-it may be that my memory is at fault. On this reading of "remember" there is still a distinction between remembering and seeming to remember, but it is not adistinction with veridicality on one side: for example one tells a tale of one's childhood that is shown to be false and one wonders whether one has mistaken fantasizing or confabulating for (mis)remembering. On either reading, however, there is no claim that can be made of the fonn:
(8) Since I remember it to have been like something, it was like something. On the first reading of "remember" the claim, while logically impeccable, does not work unless one claims a capacity to tell one's memories from one's seeming memories that one simply does not have. On the second reading, even if we could always tell fantasy from memory the consequent would not follow. So (5) Malcolm sees that nothing like (6) or (8) can be exploited in this context: we can seem to have had an experience when we have not. and for just this reason he denies that dreams are experiencesl His argument is that.rinCIll' one can be under the impressjon that one has had an experience and yet not have had it, and since if one is under the impression that one has had a dream, one has had a dream.tt having had a dream cannot be having had an experience, hence dreama are not experiences. This "criteriologica1" move has a curious consequence: it "saves" the authority of the wakened dream-rccaller, and this looJcs liU a rescue of subjectivity from the clutches of objective science, but it "saves" dreaming only at the expense ofexperience. What Malcolm sees is that if we permit a distinction between remembering and seeming to remember to apply todream recollections, the concept of dreaming is cast adrift from any criterial anchoring to first-person reports, and becomes (or is revealed to be) a theoretical concept. Once we grant that subjective, introspective or retrospective evidence does not have the authority to settle questions about the nature of dreams-for instance, whether dreams are experiences-we have to tum to the other data, the behavior and physiology of dreamers, and to the relative strengths of the theories of these, if we are to setde the question, a question which the subject is not in a privileged position to answer. Maloolm avoids this by denying that dreams are experiences, but this only concedes that one does not have a privileged opinion about one's own past experiences. 11 Thisconcession is unavoidable,l think, and Malcolm's is not " "That he really had a dream and that he is under the impreuion that he had a dream: thee are the same thing" ("Dreaming and Skepticilm," p. 32), This is the central premise of Mako!m's wo....on dreaming, and one he gas from WiugenMein:
"The qUC'Jtion whether the dreamer's memory deceives him when he reporu the dream after waking cannot arise un1ela indeed we introduce a completely new criterion for the report's 'agreeing' with che dream, a criterion whkh gives us a concept of 'cruth' as distinguilhed from 'truchfullnesf' here" (PltiltJsofIAimllllwstigotioru, pp, 222·223), It .. Malcolm's unllWC'l'Ving loyalty to thilI remark that Corea his account into such notorious claims.
I.Somet imes MaJc:oIm seems to want to "save" all "private states" in thilI way, chua either having to deny that experiences are pri"ate .atel, or having to adopt after all lOme principle like (8). See Drwnting, p. 55. the only philosophic position caused embarrassment by it. A defender of the subjective realm such as Nagel must grant that in general. whether or not it was like something to hex, whether or not the subject uperinu;ed being :Ie -questions that dlfint the subjective realm-are questions about which the mbject's subsequent subjective opinion is not authoritative. But if the subject's own convictions do not settle the matter, and if, as Nagel holds. no objective considerations are conclusive either, the subjective realm Boats out of ken altogether, except, perhaps for the subject'S convictions about the specious present. Dreams are particularly vulnerable in this regard only because. as Malcolm observes, sleepers do not and cannot exprus current convictions about the specious present (if they have any) while they are dreaming. Since our only expressible access to dreams is retrospective, dreams are particularly vulnerable, but they are not alone. The argument we have been considering is more general: the dispute between the rival theories of memory-loading can be extended beyond dreaming to all experience. For instance. just now, while you were reading my remarks about Nagel, were you experiencing the peripheral sights and sounds available in your environment? Of course you were, you say. and you can prove it to your own complete satisfaction by closing your eyes and recalling a variety of events or conditions that <XKlCCUI'red With your reading those remarks. While not central in your consciousness at the time, they were certainly there, being experienced. as your recollections show. But the cassette theorist, emboldened by the success with dreams, puts forward the subliminal periphmJl reeollection-productitm theory, the view that the variety of peripheral details in such cases are notconllciously experienced, but merely unconsciously recorded for subsequent recall. Events outside our immediate attention are not experienced at all, our theorist says. but they do have subliminal effects on short-term memory. Our capacity to recall them for a short period does not establish that they were experienced, any more than our capacity to "recall" dreams shows that they were experienced. But this is nonsense. you say: reeonling thosfperiphn'al items for subsequent ret;ollution just is~g them.
If only this bold claim were truel Look what it would do for us. Thedifference between the received view ofdreams and the cassette theory would collapse; the presumably unconscious memoryloading process of the cassette theory would tum out to be the very presentation process dear to the received view. A "conceptual relationship" could be established between experience and memory that avoided the difficulties heretofore encountered in such claims, as follows. The conceptual relationship is not between experiencing and subsequent subjective convictions of memory (the latter are not criterial), but between experiencing and something perfectly objective: the laying down thereupon of a memory trace-for however short a time and regardless of subsequent success or failure at recollection. 18 The conceptual relationship would be identity. ExfM-
Much can be said in support ofthis principle, but at this time I will restrict myself to a few brief persuasions. First, is remembering a ntCtSSdry condition for experiencing? Arguably. yes, ifyou grant that memories may not last long. The idea ofa subject, an "I," experiencing each successive state in a stream of consciousness with no recollection of its predecessors is a hopelesldy impoverished model of experience and experiencers. The familitnitJ and conAn,,", in the world ofcurrent experiences is a:necessary background for recognition and diacrimination and only short-term memory can provide this. Items that come and go eofast, or so inconspicuously•as to leave no reverberations behind in memory at aU are plausibly viewed as simply not experienced. So if remembering is a necessary condition, is it also a~condition for experiencing? Yost and Kalish say so, without supporting argument: "Dreaming is a real experience. And since dreams can be remembered they must be conscious experiences."10 Martin and Deutscher, in their article, "Remembering," concur:
So long as we hold some sortof'stoTage' or 'trace' account ofmemory, it foDowsthat we can remember only what wehave experienced, for it is in our experience of events that they "enter" the storehouse.II So remembering, in the sense of storing away in the memory for some time, is arguably a necessary and sufficient condition for ex- periencing. These are, ] think, philosophically respectable arguments for the claimed identity. and to them can be added an ulterior consideration which will appeal to physicalists if not to others. The proposed identity of experiencing and recording promises a striking simplification for physicalist theories of mind. The problematic (largely because utterly vague) presentation process vanishes as an extra phenomenon to be accounted for, and with it goes the even more mysterious audimee or recipient of those presentations. In its place isjust a relatively prosaic short-term memory capacity, the sort of thing for which rudimentary but suggestive physical models already abound.
The principle as it stands, however. is too strong. on two COWlts. Consider again Martin and Deutscher's commentary on the "storehouse" model of memory: "It is in our experience of events that they 'enter' the storehouse." What, though, of forcible or illegal entry? We need an account of something like normal entry into memory so that we can rule out, as experiences. such abnormally entered items as the undreamed dream surgically inserted by the dream researchers. We want to rule out such cases, not by declaring them impossible, for they are not, but by denying that they are experiences for the subject. As we shall see in a moment, the best way ofdoing this may have a surprising consequence. The second failing of our principle is simply that it lacks the status we have claimed. for it, It is not self-evident; its denial is not acontradiction. We must not make the mistake of asserting that this is a discovered conceptual truth about experience and memory. We must understand it as a proposal, a theoretically promising adjustment in our ordinary concepts for which we may have to sacrifice some popular preconceptions. For instance, whether animals can be held to dream, or to experience anything, is rendered an uncertainty depending on what we mean byucaU. Can animalst"«Gl1 events? Ifnot, theycannot have experiences. More radically. subjective authority about experience goes by the board entirely. Still, we get a lot in return, not the least of which is a way of diagnosing and dismissing the Pickwickian hypothesis of subliminal peripheral recollection-production.
We are still not out of the woods on dreaming, though, for we must define normal memory-entry in such a way as to admit ordinary experience and exclude tampering and other odd cases.
When the memory gets loaded by accident or interference we will not want this to count as experience, and yet we want to grant that there is such a thing as nonveridical experience. The memory-loading that occurs during a hallucination occurs during abnormal circumstances, but not soabnormal as to lead us to deny that hallucinations are experiences. But look at a slightly different case. (I do not know if this ever occurs, but it mighL) Suppose at noon Jones. who is wide awake, suffers some event in her brain that has a delayed effect: at 12: 15 she wiD"recall" having seen aghostat neon. Suppose her recoUection is as vivid as you like, but suppose her actual behavior at noon (and up until recollection at 12:15) showed no trace of horror, surprise, or cognizance of anything untoward. Had she shown any signs at D(K)D of being under the impression that something bizarre was happening, we would be strongly inclined to say she had had a hallucination then, was experiencing it then, even if she could not recount it to us until fifteen minutes later. But since she did notrMtt in any such teUingway at.noon, but proceeded about her business, we are strongly inclined to say the hallucination occurred later. at 12: 15. and was a hallucination ofruolkction of something she had never experienced, even though the cause of the hallucination occurred at noon. Since the events responsible for her later capacity to recall did not contribute to her behavior-oontrolling state at the time, they did not enter her experience then, whatever their later repercussions. But then when we apply this distinguishing principle to dreams, we find that it is quite likely that most dreams are not experiences. Whereas nightmares accompanied by moans, cries, cowering, and sweaty palms wmdd be experiences, bad dreams dreamed in repose (though remembered in agony) would not be, unless, contrary to surface appearances, their entry into memory is accomplished by engagements of the whole behavior-controlling system sufficiently normal to distinguish these cases sharply from our imaginary delayed hallucination.II If it turns out that sleep, or at least that portion of sleep during which dreaming occurs, is a state ofmore or less peripheral paralysis or inactivity; if it turns out that most of the functional areas that are critical to the governance ofour wide awake activity are in operation, then there wiD be good reason for drawing the lines around experience so that dreams are included. Ifnot, there wiDbe good reason to deny that dreams are experiences.
II Malcolm too sees an important dbtinaion between "violent nightmares" and nonnal dreams dreamed in repose. a distinction that forces him 10 daim we have leveral different.conccpla or deep. Only thus can he lave u a~truth the claim thai: we have no expel'iencn while we sleep.
Some of the relevant data are already familiar.The occurrence of REMs suggests that more then a little ofthe visual processing system is active during dream periods, and it should be a fairly straightforward task-perhaps already accomplished-to determinejust how much is. Even strongly positive results would not be overwhelming grounds for deciding that dreams are experiences, however, for in various sorts of hysteric or psychosomatic blindness there is substantial apparendy normal activity in the visual processing system, and in so-called subliminal perception the same is true, and in neither case are we inclined to suppose visual experience occurs. More compelling, in many ways, is the evidence that dreams serve a purpose: they seem to be used to redress emotional imbalances caused by frustrating experiences in waking life. to rationalize cognitive dissonances, allay anxieties, and so forth. When this task is too difficult, it seems, the dream mechanisms often go into a looping cycle; troubled people often report recurring obsessive dreams that haunt them night after night. It is implausible that such recurrent dreams must be recomposed each night,ZI so if a recurrent physiological process can be correlated with these dreams. it will appear to be a presentation process, and the presentation process will have a point: namely, to provide the emotional and cognitive-processing functional parts with the raw material for new syntheses, new accommodations, perhaps permitting a more stable or satisfying self-image for the dreamer. But even this function could easily be seen to be accomplished entirely unt'onsriowlJ. The self-presentation tactics and perceptual interpretation ploys posited by theorists as diverse as Freud and ErvingGoffman areno less plausible for being presumed to be entirely unconscious, and they serve a similar self-protective maintenance function. As Malcolm points out, dreamers' narratives can be used by Freudians and others as a valuable sourceofinformation about the internal processes that shape us, without our having to suppose that these are recollections of experiences."
It is an open, and tIuordieal question whether dreams fall inside or II I am indebted to Robert Nozkk for raiaiDg this consideration. 14~. p. 122. Mako1m quotes with approval this methodological suggestion of Freud's (from A GmnullntTodNdimt to P.syd04~. [Garden City. 1943] . p. 76):
Any dilladvanlalF rellUlling from the unl;l!l'UinIl!IDlIeaion ofdreamI. may be l'e1llllCfied by deciding lhateuctly ..hat the dreillDel" teI1I ilio count. the<b"earo. md. by ifInoriug.u that be may haveforpleD or altered. in w prooeII of .....,.Decrion.
170

ARE DREAMS EXPERIENCES'
outside the boundary of experience.t5 A plausible theory of experience will be one that does justice to thru distinguishable families of intuitions we have about experience and consciousness: those dealing with the role of experience in guiding current behavior, those dealing with ourcummt proclivities and capacities toSfIJ what we are experiencing. and those dealing with the retrospeetive or 1'tlColluriw capacity to say. In earlier work I have sharply distinguished the first and second ofthese, but underestimated the distinctness and importance ofthis third source of demands ODa theory ofconsciousness. A theory that does justice to these distinct and often inharmonious demands must abo do justice to a fourth: the functional saliencies that emerge from empirical investigation. In the end, the concept of experience may not prove to differentiate anyone thing of lufficient theoretical interest to warrant time spent in determining its boundaries. Were this to occur, the received view of dreams, like the lay view of experience in general, would not be so much disproved as rendered obsolete. It may seem inconceivable that this could happen, but armchair conceptual analysis is powerless to establish this.
Tufts Uni"""
.. Foulkes COP-rit.) dta a numberoftd1iJ:lg. ifincondusive, funherot.ervabotu: in one Rudy DO auodaUon was found between "the euitement value ofdream contem and bean or relpiration Tate-(p. 50), a datum 10be balana:d by the CUrioulfact that there are UlJuaDr action-potentials diIc:overable in the motor neuronl in the bicep of one who is uked to~bending one'. arm; lIimilar action-potenliall are found in l:hearmtl of deafmute dreamers-people whotalk with -their hands. There are allo bigh levela of activity in the IeDlOll' conex during dreaming deep.
